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TEXTILE TRADE: THE GATT EXCEPTION
Krr G. DICKERSON, PH.D.*
Textiles' have played a unique role in the economic develop-
ment of most regions of the world,2 and, therefore, have been a
ready target for restrictive trade practices.3 This paper examines
the specific trade policies for textiles which evolved under the aus-
pices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"); in
particular, the policies that contradicted the basic principles of the
General Agreement.
* Dr. Dickerson is Professor and Department Chairman, Department of Textile and Ap-
parel Management, University of Missouri-Columbia; Ph.D., St. Louis University 1973;
M.S. and B.S., Virginia Tech 1963, 1962. Dr. Dickerson is co-author, with Linda Shelton, of
a book on the United States market during the textile quota phase-out, to be published in
the United Kingdom, by Textiles Intelligence Ltd., forthcoming in 1997. Dr. Dickerson is
also co-author, with J. Jarnow, of INSIDE THE FASHION BUSINESS, 1997, Prentice Hall, as
well as author of TExTiLEs AND APPAREL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 1995, Prentice Hall, and
TEXTILES AND APPAREL IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, 1991, Macmillan Publishing Co.
Since the late 1970s, Dr. Dickerson has met with industry leaders, policy makers, and
other scholars, at both the national and international levels, to gain insight into the com-
plex issues related to trade, particularly in the textile sector. She serves on the Board of
Directors of a Fortune-500 apparel firm. Dr. Dickerson has served as a Fellow and former
President, International Textile and Apparel Association (ITAA). She was recently chosen
for the ITAA BOBBIN "Educator of the Year" Award (1996). Dr. Dickerson was chosen as one
of Textile World's "Top 10 Leaders" in 1991.
1 In trade terminology, "textiles" includes both textile products and apparel. The plural
form is typically used in this inclusive manner as if it were singular, often suggesting incor-
rect grammatical use. For example, trade specialists in this sector might say, "Textiles is a
complex area of trade." In technical terms, "textiles" refers to Standard International Trade
Classification ("SITC") 65, consisting of textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles not else-
where specified, and related products. Apparel is separately specified in SITC 84. The term
"textile complex" includes the industry chain from fiber to fabric, through end use products
including apparel, home furnishings, and industrial products.
2 See MICHEL A. AMSALEM, TECHNOLOGY CHOICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18-19 (1983)
(noting textile industry is most widespread industry in developing countries); see also
NErLs BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WORLD TRADE IN TExTILES 7 (1989) (indi-
cating textile industry has played leading role in industrialization process of most devel-
oped market economies); BRIAN TOYNE ET AL., THE GLOBAL TExTILE INDUSTRY 50 (1984)(noting textiles is one of first industries developed in any country and ranks as one of larg-
est percentages of manufacturing output).
s See Timothy A. Canova, Monologue or Dialogue in Management Decisions: A Compari-
son of Mandatory Bargaining Duties in the United States and Sweden, 12 Comp. LAB. L.J.
257, 294 (1991) (providing U.S. textile industry as example of industry covered by restric-
tive trade practices); see also Jared L. Landaw, Note, Textile and Apparel Trade Liberaliza-
tion: The Need for a Strategic Change in Free Trade Arguments, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
205, 217-22 (indicating textile industry was influential in formulating restrictive trade
legislation).
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Nations have protected their textile industries for two major
reasons. First, most countries desire control of an industry that
supplies basic needs to its people such as clothing and the furnish-
ing of dwellings.4 Second, and more importantly, many countries
have sought to protect domestic industries from external competi-
tion because of the vital role they play in economic contribution.5
Textile production has a long history, beginning in early Egyp-
tian, Greek, Roman, and Chinese civilizations. 6 In the 1960s, Brit-
ish laws were recorded that restricted fine cotton fabrics from In-
dia in an effort to stimulate the fledgling British cotton industry.'
The restrictive measures were successful, leading to a substantial
increase in production by British industry.8 Additionally, the Brit-
ish are reported to have stimulated exports and reduced competi-
tion elsewhere by restricting products used in production, includ-
ing sheep, wool, woolen yarn, worsted, and even fuller's earth used
4 See MYRON P. GUTMANN, TOWARD THE MODERN ECONOMY - EARLY INDUSTRY IN EUROPE
1500-1800 31-33 (1988) (discussing competition among European countries in textile indus-
try and noting export duties placed on English wool weakened competitive markets).
5 See BLORKER, supra note 2, at 4-5. The rise of the textile industry can be attributed to
both the potential mass-consumption of clothing, a basic human necessity, and the low
investment costs of beginning textile production. Id.; see also KANG CHAO, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF COTTON TEXTILE PRODUCTION IN CHINA 1 (1977). An underlying premise on which
the author relies is that textile production is an indispensable industrial activity because of
its role in feeding and clothing people. Id.; ToYNE ET AL., supra note 2, at 49-50. The need
for clothing and shelter are worldwide problems which have created many important in-
dustries, including the textile industry. Id. The textile industry has helped in solving these
problems by providing goods for consumption and by creating jobs for a significant portion
of the population. Id. at 50.
6 See BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 4. Blokker notes that clothing was being produced in
early Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Chinese civilizations. Id. In the Middle Ages, impor-
tant advances took place revolutionizing the industry. Id. These advances included the sub-
stitution of the spinning wheel for the handle spindle, the replacement of the vertical loom
by the horizontal loom, and the creation of the "fulling" process which removed natural
grease in wool and made fibers "mat." Id.
7 See id. at 5-6. The dynamics of British textile trade with India reveal early efforts at
trade regulation. Id. at 5. In the 1960s, India's textile industry was flourishing. Id. India's
cotton goods were widely exported throughout Europe. Id. The British woollen industry
was seriously affected by Indian imports. Id. Consequently, the woollen industry protested.
Id. at 5-6. Britain responded by imposing heavy duties on Indian cotton products, effec-
tively eliminating them from the market. Id. at n.24. Without this protection, the rise of the
British cotton industry at the end of the eighteenth century would not have existed. Id. at
6.
8 See Maxine Berg, Markets, Trade and European Manufacture, in MARKETS AND MANU-
FACTURE N EARLY INDUSTRIAL EUROPE 3, 18 (1991) (suggesting increase in British exports
during eighteenth century was closely related to British trade policies); see also BLOKER,
supra note 2, at 6 (noting increase in British cotton industry was result of high duties
placed on Indian cotton imports); P.T. ELLSWORTH & J. CLARK LErrH, THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 37 (1984) (providing numerous citations regarding importance of early role of
textiles in international economy).
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to clean wool.9 These laws were enforced with severity: for the
first offense the transgressor's left hand would be cut off; for the
second offense the penalty would be death. 10
The textile industry marked its importance in history by leading
the Industrial Revolution, first in Great Britain and other parts of
Europe and later in the United States." Textile products were the
first goods produced by machines rather than by hand. Similarly,
textile products were the first goods manufactured in factories
rather than in homes.' 2 The development of the apparel industry
followed, almost a century after the textile sector.13
I. TH SETING: WHY TEXTILE TRADE IS SENSITIVE
AND COMPLEX
The long history of the textile industry, which has been develop-
ing technically for hundreds of years,' 4 accounts for many of the
complexities in current trade.' 5 Moreover, because many seg-
9 See generally ELLswoRTH & LrrIH, supra note 8, at 8-27 (detailing early British textile
production).
10 See id. at 21 (describing penalties for violations of british textile laws).
11 See BLOKI R, supra note 2, at 4-7. Blokker states that the Industrial Revolution was
"mainly the revolution of the cotton industry in Britain." Id. at 4. He further states that the
textile industry played a leading role in the Industrial Revolution. Id. at 7. This is illus-
trated by statistics. Id. at 5. The output of cloth in Britain rose from 40 million yards in
1785 to 2,025 million yards in 1850. Id.; see also GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 31-37 (describ-
ing rise of English textile industry and offering rise of rural textile industry as one possible
explanation for expansion of large-scale industry as rise of rural textile industry); KB.
SMELLiE, GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1688 63-78 (1962) (explaining developments in Britain
which led to modem industry); ToYNE ET AL., supra note 2, at 43 (recognizing English tex-
tile technologies of spinning and fabric farming spread first to Europe and then to United
States). See generally DAVID J. JEREMY, TRANSATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE DIF-
FUSION OF TEXrE TEcHNoLOGIEs BETWEEN Brrn AND AMERICA, 1790-1830's 76-104
(1981) (discussing diffusion of British textile innovations to America and noting its eco-
nomic importance).
12 See JOHN ADDY, THE TEXTiLE REVOLUTION 24-38 (1976). Chapters three and four pro-
vide a summary of the development of the textile machines and factories in Great Britain.
Id. Author's work is based on citations from original documents included in the appendix.
Id.
13 See generally Krrrv DICKERSON, TEXTILES AND APPAREL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(1995) (summarizing development of textile industry).
14 See GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 1-12 (explaining development of early textile industry
and importance in industrialization of Europe).
15 See VINOD K AGGARWAL, LIBERAL PROTECTIONISM, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF
ORGANIZED TEXTILE TRADE 9-10 (1985). The author explains that the textile trade was a
source of conflict between countries dating back to the 1300s. Id. A statute, issued by King
Edward III in 1337 banning the import of woolen cloth, is provided as an example. Id.; see
also BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 5. The author notes long history of international trade in
textiles. Id.
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ments of the industry have limited barriers to entry, virtually
every country in the world has textile production.16
At the heart of the textile trade dilemma is the industry's role in
developing the economy of numerous nations.17 Just as the growth
of the textile industry marked the onset of the industrial revolu-
tions in Europe and the United States, it has played a similar role
in virtually every other developing nation around the world.' As
these countries move from basic agrarian economics toward indus-
trialization, the textile sector is typically the primary stepping
stone for that advancement.' 9 Uniquely suited to these early
stages of development, many segments of the industry are labor-
intensive and require only limited capital and technology to be-
gin.20 Generally, developing countries have limited capital and
technology, but have large unemployed populations, thus the tex-
tile industry is often a natural fit for aspiring nations with few
resources.21
Reliance on the textile sector for economic development is a pat-
tern that might well be considered a barometer for measuring the
stages of a country's development. Early reliance on the textile
sector is eventually replaced by other industries, as many coun-
tries move into sectors requiring increased levels of technology
16 See FREDERICK CLAIRMONTE & JOHN CAVANAGH, THE WORLD IN THEIR WEB, DYNAMICS
OF TEXTILE MULTINATIONALS 165 (1981) (noting textile industry is one industry in global
economy common to all nations); see also ToYNE ET AL., supra note 2, at 50 (stating "virtu-
ally every country has a textile industry").
17 See AGGARWAL, supra note 15, at 3-4. The author recognizes the importance of textile
trade to less developed countries. Id. In particular, the author notes that growing protec-
tion in textiles impedes the developing countries' efforts to industrialize and to finance debt
through exporting. Id. The result is often disputes between nations. Id.; see also BLOKKER,
supra note 2, at 7. It is noted that the textile industry has played a leading role in the
industrialization process of most developed market economies. Id.
18 See generally CLAlmONTE & CAVANAGH, supra note 16, at 165-97 (detailing impor-
tance of textile industry in global economics).
19 See BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 7-8 (explaining importance of textile industry in moving
toward industrialization); see also JAN DEVRiES, THE ECONOMY OF EUROPE IN AN AGE OF
CRIsIS, 1600-1750 91 (1976) (linking industrial stimulation to technological improvements
in industries including textiles where there was a marked increase in labor productivity
following mechanization).
20 Production of natural fibers, such as wool, cotton, and linen, as well as the assembly of
garments, require limited technology and capital. The production of manufactured fibers,
however, previously known as "man-made fibers," is capital and technology intensive.
Therefore, the production of manufactured fibers generally occurs in a country after ad-
vanced stages of development have been achieved. See generally AMSALEM, supra note 2, at
1-25 (describing textile industry as appropriate beginning industry for less developed
countries).
21 See DICKERSON, supra note 13, at 126-44 (explaining typical patterns of textile indus-
try in economic development).
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and capital.22 For example, textiles was the major sector to under-
gird the early development of Japan's economy, but became less
important as Japan moved into high technological industries such
as electronics. 23 Similarly, the "Asian Tigers" 24 initially built their
economies through early development of the textile sectors, but
eventually decreased emphasis on this industry as capabilities in
other sectors increased. This pattern of development is paralleled
in less developed areas of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.25
Consequently, virtually every country in the world now has a
textile sector.26 Nearly all the textile and apparel production in
less developed countries is geared toward the export market.
The complexity of this situation is that most countries are produc-
ing for the same world market, which primarily consists of con-
sumers in the more affluent industrialized nations.28 This market,
however, has not grown sufficiently to absorb the growing produc-
tion capacity worldwide. In fact, during the 1980s and 1990s, de-
mand in the major market countries has been sluggish, at the
same time that a growing number of producers have emerged on
the world stage.29 Moreover, already established players have be-
come increasingly proficient as a result of new technologies,
thereby producing more products with increasing efficiency.30
The global overcapacity for production, and the fact that the tex-
tile sector is an important contributor to essentially every national
economy, accounts for the complex and sensitive nature of trade in
this sector. As countries have developed the capabilities to pursue
more advanced industries, the textiles complex remains a major
industrial sector, and leading employer, in even the most industri-
22 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade Friction with Japan and the American Policy Re-
sponse, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1657-58 (1984) (recognizing previously strong industries,
including textiles, have been replaced by newer high technology industries including appli-
ances and communications).
2 Id. at 1658-59 (suggesting Japan's ability to adopt its products to global need by utiliz-
ing high technology advances).
24 See CLAIRMONTE & CAVANAGH, supra note 16, at 180-82 (explaining emphasis on tex-
tile industry in Asian countries, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Ko-
rea, and economic competition between these countries in textile industry).
25 See DICKERSON, supra note 13 (detailing global patterns of industry development).
26 See CLAmMONTE & CAVANAGH, supra note 16, at 165-97 (referring to textile industry
as "the crucible in which the world's fibres are transformed" and noting its importance to
all countries).
27 See id. at 166, 173, 179, 180 (providing statistics on textile and apparel production).
28 See id. at 166 (indicating market for less developed countries' products).
29 See id. at 168 (noting overall production capacity exceeds demand). See generally GuT-
MANN, supra note 4, at 107-08 (noting historical effects of world textile demand).
30 See ToYNE ET AL., supra note 2, at 172-90 (explaining challenges to textile industry).
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alized countries. 3 ' For example, the combined fiber, textile, and
apparel industries are the leading manufacturing employers in
both the European Union and the United States.
The political reality of this scenario is that these major industri-
alized nations have fought tenaciously to retain the textile indus-
tries in their own countries, protecting them from the competitive
threats of producers in low-wage nations. Additionally, the large
number of workers and the geographic dispersion in the textile
complex, particularly in the apparel sector, represents a large vot-
ing bloc with the potential to pressure policy makers to develop
and support trade policies that protect the domestic industry.
II. EARLY HISTORY: THE EXCEPTIONS TO GATT BEGIN
Although trade developed rapidly after World War II, protec-
tionism also increased. Representatives of major trading coun-
tries initiated efforts to stabilize the global trading climate.32
First, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") was established
in 1944.11 Second, in 1947, twenty-three countries established
GATT to promote unrestricted trade.34 GATT was to provide a
comprehensive approach to reducing tariffs and to establish basic
31 See generally CLAmONTE & CAVANAGH, supra note 16, at 165-97 (explaining force of
textile manufacturing and influence on world economy).
32 See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 9-10 (1990) (suggesting eco-
nomic policies were in part responsible for W.W.II and this realization led to establishment
of GATT); see also Josh Schein, Comment, Section 301 and U.S. Trade Law: The Limited
Impact of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act on American Obligations
Under GATT, 1 PAC. Rim L. & POLy J. 105, 106 (1992) (special intramural issue) (explain-
ing intent of GAT was to stabilize global trade in aftermath of W.W.II).
33 See Dale E. Hathaway, Reforming World Agricultural Policies in Multilateral Negotia-
tions, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEp. PROBS. 393, 396 (1991) (noting International Monetary
Fund was established to stabilize currencies and balance of payment positions of partici-
pating countries in response to conditions preceding and leading up to W.W.II); see also G.
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 840 (1995) (explaining origins of Interna-
tional Monetary Fund).
34 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective on Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter
"GATI]. On October 30, 1947, 23 countries signed GATT. Id.; see also Julie Leones et al.,
The Dicey Business of Agricultural Trade Policy: Where Does NAFTA Take Us?, 28 TULSA
L.J. 559, 580 (1993). Currently, the 107 contracting parties constitute 90% of global trade.
Id.
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ground rules for open trade among contracting parties.3 5 Origi-
nally, textile trade was governed by this Agreement.36
Many other significant aspects of GATT later became issues in
textile trade. Contracting parties, for instance, were curtailed in
their freedom to impose barriers on trade.3 7 A cornerstone was the
"most-favored-nation" provision which prohibited discrimination
among contracting parties.38 Also prohibited were quantitative re-
strictions.39 Tariffs, however, remained the only restrictions open
to negotiation.40 Finally, certain provisions in the GATT permit-
ted contracting parties to escape their obligations in certain cir-
cumstances without acting illegally.41 For example, Article XIX
permitted importing parties to take "safeguard measures," such as
tariffs or quotas, under certain conditions when domestic produ-
cers suffered serious injury from increased imports.42
In the 1950s, textile trade restrictions were reduced, to an ex-
tent, pursuant to general liberalization efforts under the auspices
of GATT.43 Trade among the developed countries of North
35 See R. MICHAEL GADBAW & TIMOTYr J. RICHARS, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 29 (1988) (explaining GATT was
established to oversee negotiation of international rules governing trade); see also Michael
E. Roll, Comment, Nissho Iwai Am. Corp. v. United States: Customs Appraisement and
Middleman Pricing Under Section 402 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 190,
198 (1993) (recognizing goal of GATT is to promote equal international trade standards).
36 See 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994) (mandating coordination of items included in 1974 Tex-
tiles Agreement subject to GATT 1994); see also David J. Weiler & Allyson L. Senie, Inter-
national Rules of the Textile and Apparel Trade Regime, in THE COMMERCE DEP'T SPEAKS
ON INT'L TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1994, at 505, 531 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 864) (noting WTO textile restrictions include 1947 GATr provisions); Janice
Wingo, Comment, Rules of Origin For Textiles: Implementing Legislation For GAT, 4 PAC.
RiM L. & POL'Y J. 543, 545-46 (1995) (noting Uruguay Round implications on textile
industry).
37 See Sherry M. Stephenson, ASEAN and the Multilateral Trading System, 25 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 439, 446 (1994) (discussing enforcement mechanisms to prevent trade bar-
riers by contracting parties).
38 See GATT, supra note 34, arts. I & III, 61 Stat. A12-A13, A18-A19 (describing and
outlining "Most Favored Nation" treatment).
39 See id. art. XI, 61 Stat. A32-A34 (outlining "General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions").
40 See id. art. XXVIII, 61 Stat. A71-A72 (discussing "Modification of Schedules").
41 See Wingo, supra note 36, at 547 (suggesting Art. XIX constitutes an "escape clause"
from GATT restrictions). See generally Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, GATT Safeguards: A Critical
Review of Article X=X and Its Implementation in Selected Countries, 23 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 517, 517-18 (1991) (outlining Art. XIX as "escape clause" but suggesting only lim-
ited use).
42 See GATT, supra note 34, art. XIX, 61 Stat. A58-A60 (establishing "Emergency Action
on Imports of Particular Products"); see also BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 54-55 (explaining
relationship between "legalism" and "pragmatism" as it relates to GATr).
43 See AGGARWAL, supra note 15, at 43 (stating in early 1950s most nations advocated
free trade and supported textile producers); see also Loretta F. Smith, Comment, The
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America and Western Europe benefitted from these liberalization
steps.4 4 In contrast, restrictions on imports from Japan, as well as
from many Eastern European and developing countries, were not
eased at all, but became increasingly restrictive during the decade
that followed establishment of GATT.45
After the war, the United States and British textile sectors
quickly gained market share because that about three-fourths of
Japan's textile industry was destroyed during the war.46 Ag-
garwa 47 reported that United States manufacturers were so confi-
dent that they even went on a technical mission in 1948 to help
Japan rebuild her industry.48 In addition, the United States was a
strong supporter of Japan's admission to GATT in 1955.49
As Japan quickly rebuilt her textile sector, United States indus-
try sources grew increasingly concerned.50 The Japanese knew
GATT and International Trade, 39 BuFr. L. REv. 919, 933-34 (1991) (discussing liberal
aspect of GATT philosophy).
44 See Thomas M. Kerr, What's Good for General Motors is Not Always Good for Develop-
ing Nations: Standardizing Environmental Assessment of Foreign-Investment Projects in
Developing Countries, 29 INT'L LAW. 153, 163 (1995) (contrasting impact of liberalized pro-
tections on developing and developed nations); see also Shell, supra note 33, at 927 n.354
(suggesting developing nations suffer under GATT liberalization policies); Smith, supra
note 43, at 919 (surveying varying impact of GATT on developing countries and "major
powers"); Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the
Promise of Development, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1715, 1721 (1995) (noting benefit to developing
countries resulting from Uruguay Round).
45 See AGGARwAL, supra note 15, at 43-44 (noting that in mid-1950s United States im-
posed export restraints on Japan).
46 Id. at 44-45. After W.W.II, the textile industry in the United States and in Britain
remained unharmed. Id. Japan however, the leading producer throughout the 1920s and
1930s, had over 75% of its textile capacity destroyed. Id. Consequently, United States and
British industries dominated the market while Japan attempted to rebuild. Id.; see also
ENzo GRILLI & ENRICo SASSOON, THiE NEW PROTECTIONIST WAvE 74-76 (1990). Japan was
largely ignored by major industrial countries of Western Europe and North America. Id.
The common perception was that due to its internal destruction it was to play a minor role
in world affairs. Id.
47 See AGGARwAL, supra note 15, at 44-45. As a result of the marked increase in textile
production, the United States became "overconfident" in its position. Id. The United States
failed to recognize its superiority in the textile industry as an aberration resulting from the
post W.W.II destruction in many countries. Id. This overconfidence can be seen in the
United States' efforts to assist the Japanese in rebuilding their textile industry. Id.
48 See generally Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of Japan's An-
timonopoly Law, 1994 U. IL. L. REv. 115, 117 (discussing American support of post-war
Japan). But see Alan S. Gutterman, Japan and Korea: Contrasts and Comparisons in Regu-
latory Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 267, 296 (1991)
(suggesting Japan abandoned traditional industries to focus on more modern industries
after W.W.II).
49 See AGGARwAL, supra note 15, at 45-46 (indicating American support for Japanese
admission to GATT); see also Brenda A. Jacobs, The History of the Textile Program and
How it Reveals the Future, in THE COMNERCE DEVP'T SPEAKS 1987, at 637, 640 (PLI Corp.
Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 571) (noting Japan's joining of G 'IT in 1955).
50 See AGGARwAL, supra note 15, at 46-50 (explaining increasing concerns of U.S. indus-
try as Japan became more efficient in industrialization); see also GRiLLI & SASSOON, supra
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that expanding exports to the United States had risks.51 Japanese
leaders knew that protectionist sentiments were building among
United States textile groups, and that expanding exports had the
potential for antagonizing their most important customer.52 As a
result, in December 1955, the Japanese unilaterally restrained
their exports on select cotton textiles to "promote mutually benefi-
cial relations."53 The ink was barely dry on the first agreement
when United States textile producers began to pressure for addi-
tional restrictions.54 Because Japan could hardly ignore United
States demands and retain access to the American market, the
Japanese conceded and signed a second "voluntary" export re-
straint agreement on cotton textiles in December 1956.55
It is important to consider the ironic combination of events oc-
curring at this time. First of all, the United States played an es-
sential role in the establishment of GATT, and as such, became an
official proponent of GATT's aims to eliminate discrimination
among trading partners and to avoid quantitative restrictions on
trade. 56 During this same time, the United States supported Ja-
note 46, at 74-76 (detailing Japan's economic and industrial growth during 1960s); Leo
Gross et al., Power & Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 498, 498 (noting U.S. support of Japanese trade restrictions resulted from
attempt to "mollify its domestic textile industry"); Gutterman, supra note 48, at 296-97
(noting successful revival of Japanese trade and exports).
51 See AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 48-50. Japan's textile industry was highly dependent
on U.S. market. Id. In 1956, over 22% of its total textile and apparel products were ex-
ported to the United States. Id. Additionally, over 33% of Japan's total exports to the
United States were textile and apparel products. Id. The Japanese realized the ramifica-
tions of this among U.S. industry leaders. Id.
52 Id. The Japanese desired to expand the country's exports to the United States, but
realized a move in that direction would antagonize American industry. Id.; see also Pamela
A. Bannon, Trade Relief" A Benefit or Burden for the Textile and Apparel Industries?, 19
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 701, 701 (1987) (suggesting continuation of protectionist
sentiments).
53 See AcGARwAL, supra note 15, at 48-50 (indicating Japanese responded to American
concern by restraining its exports of cotton textile products); see also Jacobs, supra note 49,
at 637 (noting Japan's voluntary limitation of cotton exports).
54 See AGGARWAL, supra note 15, at 50-53 (detailing response of American textile produ-
cers to Japanese exports).
55 Id. (explaining agreement between United States and Japan to appease American tex-
tile producers); see also Craig R. Giesse & Martin J. Lewin, The Multifiber Arrangement:
Temporary Protection Run Amuck, 19 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 51, 170 n.217 (1987) (review-
ing post-W.W.II status of Japan-United States textile trade).
56 See Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legis-
lation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 85-86 (1990) (discussing
significant U.S. role in developing nondiscriminatory trade approach and labor rights); see
also C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the
NAFTA Turned Into A Battle, 28 Gao. WASH. J. ImTr' L. & ECON. 1, 22-24, 53-60 (1994)
(comparing U.S. goals in NAFTA and GATT, and nondiscrimination within regional barri-
ers); Wingo, supra note 36, at 543-47 (noting focus on textiles in trade policies). See gener-
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pan's admission to GATT, despite resistance by Western Europe.57
Yet, the United States government found itself under serious
pressure from the domestic textile industry to restrict textile im-
ports from Japan.58 The dilemma: how could the United States
uphold its official free trade public position, yet deal with pressure
from an increasingly powerful industry to restrain imports from a
specific country? The "voluntary" export restraint ("VER") agree-
ment was the temporary answer. 59 Under this agreement, Japan
could be pressured to "voluntarily" limit her exports, and the
United States could retain its official free trade stance.
A. Section 204 of the United States Agricultural Act
The United States' domestic authority for establishing textile
quotas against imports has its legal origins in the Agricultural Act
of 1956.60 Section 204 of the act provides "relief' for domestic pro-
ducers by granting the President authority, "wherever he deter-
mines such action appropriate," to negotiate agreements limiting
imports from other countries into the United States. The provi-
sion provides that, "[tihe President is authorized to issue regula-
tions governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouses of any
such commodity, product, textiles, or textile products to carry out
any such agreement."61 This provision also authorizes the Presi-
dent to control imports of such articles from nonparticipating
countries when such agreements account "for a significant part of
ally Robert Housman & Durwood Zaeke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Develop-
ment: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INTL & CoMp. L. REv. 535, 538-43 (1992) (outlining
international trade policies).
57 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (noting that United States supported
Japan's admission to GATT).
58 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (detailing pressure from textile produ-
cers on U.S. government to curb Japanese imports).
59 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMUMSSION, THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE MUL-
TIFIBER ARRANGEMENT 2 (1978). See generally DAvm B. YOFFIE, POWER AND PROTECTIONISM:
STRATEGIES OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 47-79 (1983). Professor Yoffie sum-
marizes the background, negotiation and implementation of the VER's that have been er-
ected against textiles. Id. He notes that the United States imposed the first significant VER
against Japan in order to modify its domestic textile industry without departing from the
nondiscriminatory purpose of GATT. Id.
60 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1988) [hereinafter "Agricultural Act § 204"].
61 See Exec. Order No. 11,651, 37 Fed. Reg. 4,699 (1972). President Nixon's directive
established administrative procedures for implementing Agricultural Act § 204. Id.; see
also Exec. Order No. 11,539, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,733 (1970). The Secretary of State is author-
ized, pursuant to § 204, to negotiate bilateral agricultural trade agreements. Id.
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world trade in the articles with respect to which the agreement
was concluded."6 2
At first glance, it may seem peculiar that a provision in an agri-
culture act provided the applicable legal basis under United
States law for imposing quotas on textile imports.68 History pro-
vides insight on this anomaly. In the 1950s, when section 204 was
first enacted, cotton was the primary textile fiber in use-repre-
sented in nearly all textile trade.64 Virtually all imported textile
products made of cotton were considered a threat.65 The language
of section 204, however, was carefully drafted to cover all textiles,
regardless of the fiber.66 Because of the leverage this provision
provides to domestic producers, section 204 was retained as the
legal basis for restricting imports, long after other fibers became
equally important. 7
B. Introduction of the "Market Disruption" Concept
The concept of "market disruption" was introduced into trade
circles in 1959, becoming a central issue in the ensuing textile
trade policies.68 At the Contracting Parties69 meeting in 1959, the
62 See Agricultural Act § 204, supra note 60.
63 See Arthur Aronoff, Recent Developments in Trade and Investment in Eastern Europe
and the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, in THE COMMERCE DEP'T
SPEAKS ON INT'L TRADE & INvEsTMENT 1994, at 259, 277 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 863) (noting § 204 as authority to negotiate textile trade restrictions
with Soviet Union states that are not GATT members); Seventh Annual Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 128 F.R.D. 409, 515(1989) (distinguishing § 204 from Tariff Act restrictions during International Trade Law
Breakout Session on Country of Origin Rules).
64 See Bannon, supra note 52, at n.45 (noting STA countries "accounted for over 90% of
cotton textile trade in free world").
65 See Rebecca M. Reese, International Trade in Textiles and Apparel: The Legal Regime,
in Tim COMmERCE DEP'T SPEAKS 1992: DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPORT ADMINISTRATION: EXPORT
& INvEsTMENT ABROAD, at 381, 383 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
789) (noting competition from Japanese cotton imports).
66 Id. (noting that Agricultural Act § 204 refers only to "textiles or textile products"); see
also R. BRANDms, THE MAKING OF TEXTILE TRADE POLICY, 1935-1981 23 (1982) (interpreting
Agricultural Act).
67 See Agricultural Act § 204, supra note 60. Section 204 became an important mecha-
nism allowing the U.S. government to unilaterally impose import limits on textile products
from non-GATT members, such as Taiwan, which could not be part of later GATT-spon-
sored textile agreements. Id.68 See BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 71-72. The author notes that the predominant issue at
the GATT ministerial meeting of 1959 was "market disruption." Id. This issue had infor-
mally been discussed in addresses by E. Wyndham White, Executive-Secretary of GATT,
earlier that year. Id.; see also Renee T. Legierski, Note, Out In the Cold: The Combined
Effects of NAFTA and the MFA On the Caribbean Basin Textile Industry, 2 MIN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 305, 309-10 (1993) (explaining "market disruption" and effect on textiles).69 See Wingo, supra note 36, at 545 (describing "Contracting Parties" as term used to
identify signatory countries of GATT).
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United States delegate stated that sharp increases in textile im-
ports over a brief period of time could have serious economic, polit-
ical, and social repercussions in the importing countries. The
United States representative officially proposed that GATT mem-
bers study the problem posed by "the adverse effects of an abrupt
invasion (by sharp increases in imports) of established markets."7"
A GATT Working Party71 examined the situation and concluded
that a problem did exist; a problem the group labeled "market dis-
ruption." The report added that "there were political and psycho-
logical elements of the problem" which, in the absence of adequate
safeguards, made it unlikely that the countries already imposing
unilateral barriers would refrain from doing so. 7 2 Countries were
already taking individual measures that contravened the aims of
GATT. Following the study, the Contracting Parties adopted, on
November 19, 1960, a resolution entitled "Avoidance of Market
Disruption."7" The resolution sought to keep these trade issues
under GATT, rather than having countries impose their own uni-
lateral restrictions. 4 The definition of market disruption adopted
by the Contracting Parties introduced three fundamental changes
that had important implications relative to GATT's Article XIX
safeguard clause. 5
The first significant change was that an allegedly injurious in-
crease in imports need not have occurred-a potential increase in
imports could be sufficient to justify additional restrictions. Sec-
ond, imports of a product from particular sources, rather than im-
70 GATT, T xn.Es AND CLOTHING IN THE WoRLD EcoNoMY 64 (1984) [hereinafter TEx-
TILES AND CLOTHING].
71 See BLOKKEa, supra note 2, at 147-48. A "Working Party on Textiles" was established
at a meeting of the GATT Council in May, 1972. Id. The purpose of the Working Party was
to conduct a factual study "regarding the economic, technical, social, and commercial ele-
ments which influence world trade in textiles." Id.; see also Legierski, supra note 68, at 309-
10 (noting goals and recommendations of 1959 Working Party); Henry R. Zheng, Defining
Relationships and Resolving Conflicts Between Interrelated Multinational Trade Agree-
ments: The Experience of MFA and GATT, 25 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 45, 54-55 (1988) (noting
Working Party suggested GATT recognize market disruption problems of textile trade and
develop solutions to problems).
72 See Zheng, supra note 71, at 54-55 (noting Working Party skepticism concerning con-
formity with GATT).
73 GATT, B.I.S.D. (14th Supp.) at 38 (1966) (memorializing Nov. 19, 1960 adoption of
committee report).
74 See id. para. 3, no. 41374; see also Reese, supra note 65, at 386 (documenting issuance
of guidelines by Working Party Committee on Avoidance of Market Disruption).
75 See Zheng, supra note 71, at 54-64 (indicating GATT Article XIX safeguard measures
permit contracting party to modify or withdraw its concessions when domestic producers
are seriously injured or threatened by imports).
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ports of a product in general, could be singled out as the problem.
This enabled application of additional restrictions on a country-
specific basis, that is, discriminatory, rather than on an MFN ba-
sis. 76 Third, the existence of a price differential between particular
imports and goods of comparable quality sold on the domestic
market, could be used in determining the need for additional
restrictions.
Blokker 77 notes that the decision on market disruption was the
legal result of the developed countries' dissatisfaction, mainly in
the field of textile trade, with the balance between GATT's basic
goal of trade liberalization and the potential for safeguard action.
The market disruption decision shifted the balance to permit the
possibilities for increasing protectionist measures under GATT.
This decision paved the way for selective safeguard restrictions
against the lower-priced textile products from low-wage develop-
ing nations. Although not originally intended to apply solely to
textiles and apparel, these are the only two industries to which
the Contracting Parties applied the concept.78
The combination of section 204 at the domestic level and the
legitimization of the market disruption concept at the interna-
tional level, provided two important provisions through which the
United States established subsequent policies to restrain im-
ported textile products.
III. THE 1960s COTTON AGREEMENTS
Beginning in the early 1960s, a set of textile trade rules
emerged to cover the complex issues related to this sector.79
76 See Walter Kolligs, Note, The United States Law of Countervailing Duties and Federal
Agency Procurement After the Tokyo Round: Is It 'GATT Legal?", 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
553, 561 (1990) (discussing effect of unconditional and conditional MFN clauses). See gener-
ally L. Jay Kuo, Comment, Farewell to Jackson-Vanik: The Case For Unconditioned MFN
Status For the People's Republic of China, 1 AsIAN L.J. 85 (1994) (discussing targeting of
China's trade status in context of human rights violations).
77 See BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 87 (discussing tension between trade liberalization and
safeguard action); see also Ernesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure/ VER Dilemma: The
Jekyll and Hyde of Trade Protection, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 105, 112-13 (1994) (sug-
gesting developed countries initiated voluntary export restraints to protect competitive
advantage).
78 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3511 & 3591 (1994). "Secretary of
Commerce shall publish, in federal register, a list of products as set out in the agreement
on textiles and clothing referred to in § 3511(d)(4)." Id. at § 3591.
79 See Bannon, supra note 52, at n.33-39 (discussing mechanisms designed to control
cotton trade); see also Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 94-95 (noting role of textiles in
1960 presidential election and goals of Cotton Textiles Committee).
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Although textile products had already become a sensitive area of
trade, and special restrictive measures had been used, they were
applied in a piecemeal fashion. The significance of the textile poli-
cies that developed in the 1960s and that continued for four de-
cades into the present,80 is that a special regime was created to
"manage" textile trade alongside the rules of the General Agree-
ment for all other trade.
By 1960, United States government leaders experienced in-
creased pressure from the domestic textile industry to provide ad-
ditional protection against imports. Politicians, beginning with
John F. Kennedy, learned to exploit these concerns in exchange
for the support of the large number of voters represented in the
industry.8 ' After his election, President Kennedy proposed a pro-
gram to assist the United States textile complex, including the de-
velopment of an international agreement to govern textile trade.8 2
The President directed the Department of State "to arrange for
calling an early conference of the principal textile exporting and
importing countries ... [to] seek an international understanding
which will provide a basis for trade that will avoid the undue dis-
ruption of established industries."8 3
A. The Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International
Trade in Cotton Textiles ("STA")
The conference to discuss a multilateral textile agreement was
held under the sponsorship of GATT, but oddly enough, only about
80 See generally Zheng, supra note 71, 302-07 (providing overview of multilateral textile
policies).
81 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 94. The United States textile lobby used its
political influence to a strike deal with Massachusetts Senator John Kennedy, exchanging
political support for multilateral import restrictions. Id.
It is important to keep in mind that textiles was one of only a very limited number of
trade-impacted industries at the time. Others included steel and shoes. Therefore, the set-
ting was different from the present time when many more U.S. industries can be consid-
ered trade-impacted.
82 See BRmAmNs, supra note 66, at 18-19 (discussing proposed plan to assist United States
textile industry); see also Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 94. During the first months of
his administration, President Kennedy announced seven-point textile program calling for
an international conference between textile importing and exporting countries which led to
the Short Term Arrangement. Id.
83 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 94 (noting then Senator Kennedy's pledge to
develop a "Comprehensive Industry-Wide Remedy"); see also Jacobs, supra note 49, at 637
(noting importance of developing international understanding to protect established
industries).
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half the Contracting Parties participated. As Blokker8 4 noted,
given the subject of the meeting, which represented a challenge to
the fundamental aims of GATT, it would have been more appro-
priate to have held the discussion in the General Assembly rather
than on the fringes of GATT.
The meeting resulted in promulgation of the STA.8 5 The STA
was intended to be a stop-gap measure until a more permanent
mechanism could be developed. 8 The STA, which was effective
from October 1961 to September 1962, authorized one-year re-
strictions on sixty-four categories of cotton textiles to avoid mar-
ket disruption. 7
United States government and industry sources believed they
had discovered the "near-perfect" answer to textile trade
problems. According to an article in a leading textile trade paper,
Daily News Record, the "cotton textile pact is to be cited as an
ideal example of how the United States can liberalize its trade pol-
icies while still protecting specialized industries from market dis-
ruption."88 Other GATT members, however, resented the United
States negotiators' subtle threat to close off their markets unless
the multilateral agreement materialized.
The STA represented a significant occurrence in GATT history.
Textiles and apparel were the only products to be formally ex-
empted from the provisions of GATT and given a special set of
rules, or regime, of their own.
Two criteria were used as justification for identifying textiles
and apparel as a "special case." First, the "challenge presented by
'low cost' imports was, with only minor exceptions, unique to tex-
tiles (and later clothing)." Second, was the "importance of employ-
84 See BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 100 (noting meeting challenging fundamental aims of
GATT would have more properly been conducted by General Assembly, consisting of all
member states); see also Jacobs, supra note 49 (indicating only United States and seven
importing countries attended informal meetings).
85 See Reese, supra note 65, at 387 (suggesting STA resulted from 1961 meeting held by
working party regarding market disruption).
86 See Jacobs, supra note 49, at 640-45 (discussing origin and recommendations of STA).
87 See id. (discussing cotton restrictions).
88 AaGARwAL, supra note 15, at 79 (quoting Daily News Record, Oct. 26, 1961); see also
Landaw, supra note 3, at 226 (noting effectiveness of Short Term Arrangement on cotton
textile trade at ensuring protection of domestic producers).
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ment and production of those industries to the country's overall
economic activity. "89
The STA, and the Long Term Agreement which followed, repre-
sented the formal beginning of a new set of trade rules, coexisting
with the rules of GATT, for a specific sector. An important part of
world trade was formally exempted from GATT rules. Particu-
larly, textiles were immune from the nondiscrimination rule and
the general prohibition of quantitative restrictions. In other
words, quotas were legitimized under the STA.90
B. The Long-Term Arrangement Regarding Trade in Cotton
Textiles (aLTA ")
In February 1962, nineteen major trading nations agreed to the
LTA which, like the STA, permitted importing countries to employ
restrictive measures if they claimed market disruption or the
threat of market disruption from textile and apparel imports.
Countries were permitted to either negotiate bilateral agreements
with exporting countries, or impose unilateral restraints if the two
trading nations were unable to reach an agreement. These unilat-
eral restraints differed from those which existed prior to the STA
and LTA. These two agreements provided a special mechanism,
outside the normal GATT rules, which legitimized the bilateral
agreements, containing quotas, and conditional unilateral
restraints.
The LTA limited the volume growth of imports to five percent
per year for most cotton products. Chine,91 as well as Keesing and
Wolf,92 noted that the five percent growth rate seemed ironic since
the United States textile and apparel trade deficit was only 4.9
89 TEXTILES AND CLOTHING, supra note 70, at 10; see also Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55,
at 81 (noting belief that textiles is "special case" which has become "institutionalized" and
hence its ability to secure protection).
90 See DICKERSON, supra note 13, at 330 (discussing STA's legitimization of quotas); see
also Jacobs, supra note 49 (citing MFA's "official condonation" of extra-GATT measures
including unilateral restraint); Reese, supra note 65, at 381 (noting MFA's sanctioning of
intricate system of bilateral and unilateral quotas in international trade on textiles outside
GATT trading system).
91 See generally WILLA CLINE, THE FuTUE OF WORLD TRADE IN TExTILEs AND APPAREL
147 (1990) (regarding political reality of appeasing large and increasingly powerful domes-
tic industry).
92 See DONALD KEESING & MARTn WOLF, Tzx'ru QuoTAs AGAINST DEVELOPING COUN.
TaIS 17-18 (1980) (questioning five percent growth quota on cotton imports); see also
Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 100 (indicating one of basic objectives of MFA has been
limiting increases in aggregate import volume).
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percent of value added at the time, and the European Economic
Community 3 had a surplus. The LTA was renewed in 1967 and
again in 1970.
The LTA served as a political buffer on the United States front
for President Kennedy, who aspired to launch a major global
round of trade negotiations to reduce trade barriers, particularly
tariffs, across all sectors. President Kennedy knew that he would
be unable to launch his "Kennedy Round" unless the powerful tex-
tile and apparel industries, employing seventeen percent of all
manufacturing workers in the industrialized countries at the
time, were appeased. Hence, the completion of the 1962 LTA and
the protection it afforded the United States textile industry served
to permit the President to advance the Kennedy Round, reducing
trade restrictions without opposition from the textile sector. The
Kennedy Round reduced tariffs on textile and apparel products
less than any other category. The textile sectors were able to im-
pose quota limits, as well as retain the highest levels of tariffs on
imports of any United States trade category. In short, at the same
time that President Kennedy sought reduced trade barriers
among all trading partners and across all categories of trade, the
textile sector was singled out as an exception for multiple forms of
protection.
IV. THE MULTIFIBER ARRANGEMENT ("MFA")
The STA and the LTA imposed restrictions only on cotton prod-
ucts. By the early 1970s, technological progress permitted manu-
facturers in Japan and a few other countries to export a growing
volume of products made from manufactured fibers.94 Because cot-
ton products were under restrictions, producers in other countries
shifted increasingly to manufactured fiber products, which were
93 See, e.g., Jonas M. Grant, "Jurassic" Trade Dispute: The Exclusion of the Audio Visual
Sector From the GA7T, 70 IND. L.J. 1333, 1335 n.26 (1995). Currently, the 15 members of
the EU are the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and France. Id.
The six member European Economic Community ("EEC") has evolved to become the 15
member European Union ("EU"). The West European countries of the EEC or EU have had
positions on textile trade similar to those of the United States. Together, Western Europe
and the United States have constituted the major markets for textile products from the less
developed countries. These two major world powers have frequently cooperated in securing
common textile trade restraints.
94 These are fibers made from chemicals or others such as rayon from regenerated cellu-
lose, also known as manmade fibers.
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not under restraint at the time. Although eighty-two nations were
signatories to the LTA, the cotton arrangements became increas-
ingly obsolete and textile/apparel imports grew substantially.
Keesing and Wolf noted, "the developing countries succeeded in
finding, during this period, more holes in the dike than the devel-
oped [countries] found fingers with which to close them."95
Having witnessed President Kennedy's election success after
pandering to the textile and apparel sectors, all three 1968 presi-
dential candidates96 sought the industry's support by promising to
extend import restraints to products made of manufactured fibers
and wool. After his election, President Nixon proceeded to follow
through on his campaign promises, hoping to retain the industry's
support for his re-election. He appointed Secretary of Commerce
Maurice Stans to proceed with efforts to develop an arrangement
to cover all fibers. However, other major trading partners were
cool to the proposal. The Europeans were already controlling
their non-cotton imports through bilateral and unilateral meas-
ures. The Europeans also feared that additional measures might
limit their own shipments to the United States markets. Rejected
in his initial overtures, Secretary Stans believed he could eventu-
ally entice the Europeans to join his plan by concluding such re-
strictive United States bilateral agreements with the Asians, thus
permitting diversion of products from those countries to European
markets. He reasoned that this would encourage the Europeans
to join a multilateral accord, his ultimate goal.97
The Japanese were equally unenthusiastic toward the United
States proposal. Having become stronger economically and politi-
cally than in the 1950s VER era, the Japanese were unwilling to
consider a multilateral textile agreement that included wool and
manufactured fiber products. Destler reported that "[tlo most
95 See KEESING & WoLF, supra note 92, at 22; see also Pamela A. Bannon, Trade Relief A
Benefit Or Burden For the Textile and Apparel Industries?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 701,
708 (1987) (noting that since LTA only covered cotton textiles, exporting countries shifted
to trade in manmade fibers to make end-run around LTA restrictions).
96 Those three candidates were Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, and George Wallace.
See John Greenwald & Scott Hoing, The United States and the MFA IV: Opportunities Lost,
19 LAw & POL'Y IN"L Bus. 171, 181 n.34 (1987) (noting both former Vice President Nixon
and Vice President Humphrey made textile trade important issue in their 1968 campaigns
for president).
97 See AerARwAL, supra note 15, at 118-21 (detailing Secretary of Commerce Stans' ef-
forts to obtain multilateral agreements with Europe and Far East); see also Giesse &
Lewin, supra note 55, at 96 (noting within one-half year after taking office, Nixon adminis-
tration began negotiating VER's with Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea).
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Americans, the Stans mission was a debacle: those who wanted
textile quotas got nothing; those who cared most about United
States-Japanese relations had seen perhaps the worst public con-
frontation on a substantive policy issue since the Occupation."9"
Intense negotiations between the United States and Japan over
textile trade followed from 1969 to 1971, at times occurring at the
highest levels between President Nixon and Japanese Prime Min-
ister Eisaku Sato. Efforts included two summit conferences, two
cabinet-level ministerial conferences, and at least nine other ma-
jor negotiations. Textile trade difficulties dominated relations be-
tween the two countries for about three years, straining relation-
ships far beyond the textile issue. President Nixon feared an
agreement might not be reached before the election and, in re-
sponse thereto, he tightened the pressure on the Japanese, going
so far as to threaten to invoke the "Trading with the Enemy Act"99
to impose unilateral restraints. On the day the Trading with the
Enemy provision was to take effect, the Japanese agreed to limit
shipments of wool and manufactured fibers.
Following the Japanese agreement, the United States reached
similar bilateral agreements with Hong Kong, South Korea, and
Taiwan to limit textile products in the additional fiber categories.
Soon afterward, Stans' earlier prediction that bilaterals with ma-
jor Far Eastern suppliers would encourage the Europeans to
change their minds proved correct. Once the United States had
more restrictive agreements with the Asians on products of all fi-
bers, shipments were diverted increasingly to European mar-
kets. 100 A multifiber arrangement seemed inevitable, once the
Europeans willingly participated.
98 See generally I.M. DESTLER ET AL., ThE TEXTILE WRANGLE: CONFLICT IN JAPANESE-
AMERiCAN RELATIONS, 1969-1971 275-314 (1979) (providing detailed account of crisis that
began when United States demanded that Japan restrict her exports of manufactured fiber
and wool textile products).
99 See Trading With Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1988). This Act was the equivalent of
"bringing in the tanks" to pressure Japan. The Act was originally signed in 1917, when the
enemy was Germany, and amended 11 days after the Pearl Harbor attack to provide: "Dur-
ing the time of war or during any period of national emergency declared by the President,
the President may... regulate... any... importation or exportation of... any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest. Id.; see also DESTLER ET
AL., supra note 98, at 96 (indicating after two years of stalled negotiations President Nixon
threatened East Asian importers with invoking Trading with Enemy Act, unless they en-
tered into bilateral agreements with United States).
100 See AGGARwAL, supra note 15, at 123 (noting diversion of imports to European mar-
kets following United States agreements with Asian countries); see also Giesse & Lewin,
supra note 55, at 80 n.174 (noting European recession lasted until 1985-86).
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A GATT Working Party began a study of world textile trade in
1972, with the charge of seeking alternative multilateral solutions
to the world textile trade problem. Negotiations ensued under
GATT sponsorship, leading to a new multilateral framework
known as the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Tex-
tiles. This agreement, more commonly known as the Multifiber
Arrangement ("MFA"), was concluded at the end of 1973 and be-
came effective in January 1974, for a four-year period.
A. MFA I: 1974-1977
The MFA was an extension of the LTA in most respects; how-
ever, it was considered a more balanced arrangement that took
into account the interests of both the exporting and importing
countries. Article 1.2 stated that the objective was:
to achieve the expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers to
such trade and the progressive liberalization of world trade in
textile products, while at the same time ensuring the orderly
and equitable development of this trade and the avoidance of
disruptive effects in individual markets and on individual
lines of production in both importing and exporting
countries. 101
As the authors of GATT's Textiles and Clothing in the World
Economy10 2 noted, a principal aim was the economic growth of the
developing countries and a substantial increase in their earnings
from trade in textiles and apparel. The agreement was idealistic,
perhaps unrealistically so, in its intent to help both the developed
and undeveloped countries. In general, the four years under the
initial agreement was a time of relative trade liberalization for
textiles.
The Arrangement provided a safeguard mechanism for import-
ing countries to employ when market disruption occurred, but it
was to be used under certain defined circumstances. Importing
101 See GATT, ARRANGEMENT REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TEXTILES 6 (1974); see
also Zheng, supra note 71 (indicating MFA sought to balance exporting countries' need to
expand trade with importing countries' desire to protect textile industry).
102 TExTIEs AND CLOTHING, supra note 70, at 74; see also Greenwald & Hoing, supra
note 96, at 182 (discussing MFA objective to achieve progressive liberalization of world
trade in textiles).
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countries were expected to simultaneously pursue steps to make
their domestic industries more competitive with global imports. '0 3
As its name implies, the MFA extended fiber coverage to include
manufactured fibers and wool, as well as cotton and cotton blends.
Certain handloom fabrics and cottage industry products were ex-
cluded, as were properly certified traditional ethnic handicraft
products.
The MFA was actually quite general. Through the bilateral
agreements negotiated by participating countries, the MFA was
designed to "ensure the orderly and equitable development" of tex-
tile trade. 10 4 The MFA served as an umbrella agreement, under
which bilateral agreements were structured. Although any coun-
try might have negotiated a bilateral agreement, a predictable
pattern emerged where the industrialized countries negotiated bi-
lateral agreements' 0 5 with less developed exporting countries that
desired to ship to the developed countries' markets. Through the
bilateral agreements, quota levels were established on textile
product categories that were perceived to cause, or to have the po-
tential of causing, market disruption in the importing markets.
This significant departure from GATT's nondiscrimination rule
permitted importing countries to single out exporting countries
considered to be a problem and negotiate varying agreements
among textile trading countries. For example, the United States'
quota levels might vary significantly from Hong Kong to South
Korea to Taiwan, depending almost entirely on the extent to
which a country's products were considered threats.
Several new provisions were included in the MFA that had not
been present in the LTA. First, a multilateral surveillance insti-
tution, the Textiles Surveillance Body ("TSB"), was established to
supervise the implementation of the MFA. Second, a Textiles
103 See Greenwald & Hoing, supra note 96, at 182 nn.37-38 (noting MFA seeks to ensure
development of textile trade in participating countries and to require detailed reports, to
Textile Surveillance Body, explaining why import restrictions are required).
104 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1974 Geneva, Arrangement Regarding In-
ternational Trade in Textiles, Art.1, Item 2, at 6. In Article 1, Item 2, parties to the Arrang-
ment spelled out the objectives which took into account the needs of both importing and
exporting countries. Id.
105 This consisted of the countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the United States.
Australia was a signatory in the first MFA but did not participate in later renewals. E.g.,
Agreement on Trade Relations, Jan. 23, 1991, U.S.-Mong., 30 I.L.M. 515; New Textile
Agreement, Feb. 13, 1988, U.S.-Mex, 27 I.L.M. 451; Agreements on Civil Air Transport,
Textiles, Maritime Transport, and Consumer Affairs, Sept. 17, 1980, U.S.-P.R.C., 19 I.L.M.
1105.
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Committee was formed as the management body, composed of rep-
resentatives of all the signatory member nations. Third, stricter
rules for determining market disruption were established to dis-
courage unwarranted claims of disruption. Fourth, quota al-
lowances were permitted to grow by six percent annually rather
than five percent under the LTA. Finally, new provisions for
quota flexibility were introduced. The new provisions were:
"swing" (which permitted transfer from one category to another to
take advantage of unused quota), "carry forward" (which permit-
ted borrowing from the next year's quota), and "carryover" (which
allowed the exporting country to add unused quota from one year,
to the following year's quota).
Paul Wurth, the first TSB Chairman, 10 6 noted that the "Ar-
rangement is in effect a multilateral contract, freely entered by
those countries wishing to participate in it." All the developed
countries and all the major textile exporting nations, including
those which were not GATT Contracting parties, joined for a total
of forty-two participants, counting the European Community as
one participant. 10 7
B. MFA II: 1977-1981
As noted, the MFA was originally a four-year agreement. How-
ever, the major industrialized countries pressed for subsequent
extensions to allow for additional "time to adjust." The renewals
of the MFA that followed were "Protocols of Extension," that is,
extensions of the original MFA to which changes were appended.
By the 1977 renewal, much of the altruism present in the origi-
nal agreement had disappeared, particularly on the part of the
Western European countries. Once the original 1973 pact was
signed, the United States promptly negotiated bilateral agree-
ments with the leading textile exporting nations, slowing the
trade flow in the direction of the United States market. In con-
106 PAUL WURTH, THE ARRANGEMENT REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TEXTILES 57-
59 (1981); see Sam Laird, Latin American Trade Liberalization, 4 MwNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
195, 206 (1995) (indicating Latin American countries have not employed MFA against trad-
ing partners). But see Zheng, supra note 71, at 86-88 (suggesting MFA restrictions are
imposed on countries not participating in agreement).
107 GATT, supra note 34, at 77; see Wingo, supra note 36, at 548-49 (noting that approxi-
mately 80% of United States textile and apparel imports from developing countries are
covered by MFA quotas).
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trast, the European Community 08 was much slower in concluding
bilaterals because of the additional time required to develop a
common position among its member nations.10 9 The prompt
United States agreements not only protected the United States
market from imports, but also diverted trade toward the Euro-
pean Community markets. Consequently, during the first four
years, imports grew far more in the European Community than in
United States markets. Textile import growth in the European
Community, when added to the effects of a serious recession in
Europe, resulted in European negotiators coming to the MFA re-
newal talks in a far tougher mood than that of four years ear-
lier.110 Negotiators were, of course, also being pressured by Euro-
pean textile industry groups.
Although the United States had been the force behind the origi-
nal MFA, the Europeans dictated the terms of the 1977 extension.
The Europeans were particularly concerned about the six percent
growth rate permitted under the MFA and the difficulty of having
to prove market disruption as a prerequisite to negotiate bilateral
agreements with a growth rate of less than six percent. Both Eu-
ropean Community and United States industry sources pressed to
have quota growth rates tied to domestic market growth, arguing
that it was unfair for import quotas to grow six percent annually
when the domestic market was growing only one percent per year.
The European Community achieved its goal for "jointly agreed
reasonable departures" from the terms of the original MFA. This
provision meant that participating countries could negotiate bilat-
eral agreements that no longer complied with the provisions of the
original MFA that had been agreed upon by all members."' The
developing exporting members opposed this controversial clause
because the "departures" worked to their detriment. The depar-
ture included reduced quota levels, denials or reduction of the flex-
108 See, e.g., The Ten's Textile Tangle, ECONOauMsT, Nov. 14, 1981, at 71. The European
Community ("EC") was originally known as the European Economic Community ("EEC")
and consisted of six members. Id. At the time of MFA II, the EC had grown to 10 members.
Id.
109 See id. (noting failure of EC members to agree on proposed MFA on four separate
occasions).
110 See KEESING & WOLF, supra note 92, at 52-70 (providing additional details related to
1977 MFA renewal); see also AGGAWAL, supra note 15, at 143-66 (providing further details
regarding 1977 MFA renewal).
111 See TErTIs AND CLOTHiNG, supra note 70, at 80-81 (indicating participating coun-
tries could reasonably depart from MFA terms through bilateral agreements).
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ibility provisions, and growth rates reduced below six percent.
The renewed agreement gave the developed countries wide lati-
tude to negotiate highly restrictive bilateral agreements. 1 12 Some
quota growth rates were reduced to zero. Moreover, the "reason-
able departures" clause weakened the effectiveness of the TSB.
The TSB could no longer oversee the implementation of the MFA
if the MFA was not being followed as originally agreed.
During this time, both the European Community and the
United States developed safety-net provisions to apply restraints
on unrestricted exports where shipments reached a certain
threshold. In Europe this was known as the "basket extractor"
mechanism and the United States version was termed the "call
mechanism." Under each mechanism, where an exporting na-
tion's shipments reached a certain level, consultations between
the two governments resulted. These mechanisms were intended
to apply restraints to previously unrestrained exports when the
importing nation believed a risk of market disruption was present.
The provisions of MFA II changed fundamentally the original
Arrangement, resulting in extremely protectionist bilateral agree-
ments that violated the purpose of the original Arrangement.
Keesing and Wolf referred to the "reasonable departures" clause
as a sharp deviation from the norms of the MFA. 1 13 They con-
cluded that this clause provided a "departure from a departure-a
way of waiving the provisions of an agreement which was itself a
derogation from GATT principles."" 4
C. MFA III: 1981-1986
Despite the restrictive nature of MFA II, textile and apparel im-
ports continued to grow dramatically in both European Commu-
nity and United States markets.11 5 At least two major trends sur-
faced between 1977 and 1981. First, the number of exporting
nations producing in this sector increased sharply.1 6 Second, the
112 See Landaw, supra note 3, at 211 (noting that MFA II was negotiated in response to
EC's desire for "more restrictive regulations regime"). See generally Steven Jones, Bar-
gaining Set for July on New Accord for Global Trade in Garments, Textiles, WALL ST. J.,
May 29, 1990, at A3 (discussing flexibility of bilateral agreements).
113 TExTrxs AND CLOTHING, supra note 70, at 70.
114 Id..
115 See Landaw, supra note 3, at 211 (documenting continued growth of imports in U.S.
markets despite tightening of quota restrictions under MFA II).
116 See id. (noting increase in number textile producing nations).
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apparel trade deficits were becoming more pronounced because a
growing portion of shipments from the less developed countries
were emphasizing production in the apparel area.
117
Domestic trade politics in both the European Community and
the United States played an increasingly strong role in shaping
negotiations for this MFA extension. Industry sources demanded
greater protection; United States industry leaders argued that the
price differential between imported products and comparable do-
mestic goods provided justification for added protection from im-
ports. By 1985, the United States industry leaders became so de-
manding and dissatisfied with the protection afforded under the
MFA that a textile bill was introduced in the United States Con-
gress to set additional limits on textile and apparel products.",,
The developing exporting countries succeeded in having the
"reasonable departures" clause removed in this extension. How-
ever, another provision, referred to as the "anti-surge mecha-
nism,"1 9 provided that "[w]here such significant difficulties stem
from consistently under-utilized larger restraint levels and cause
or threaten serious and palpable damage to domestic industry, an
exporting participant may agree to mutually satisfactory solutions
or arrangements. Such solutions or arrangements shall provide
117 See DICKERSON, supra note 13, at chs. 5-6 (noting increase in apparel trade deficit
during MFA II as result of emphasis in apparel production by less developed countries); see
also ToYvu ET AL., supra note 2, at ch.2. Certain patterns are relatively predictable as
countries go through the early stages of development. Id. For example, the most underde-
veloped countries may be able to perform simple assembly operations of garments whose
components have come from elsewhere. Id. At later stages, countries with greater capital
and technological capabilities are able to produce more advanced textiles and other compo-
nents. Id.
118 H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). In March 1985, Representative Edward Jen-
kins (D, GA) introduced H.R. 1562, the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985,
the "Jenkins bill." Id. This bill would have replaced the bilateral agreement system with a
unilateral restraint system, negating more than 30 U.S. bilateral agreements negotiated in
good faith with trading partners. Id. Major Asian suppliers would have experienced reduc-
tions of approximately 30 percent in shipment levels. Id. Both the House and the Senate (S.
680) passed the bill; President Reagan vetoed it; and the House lacked only eight votes to
override the veto. Id. Some industry sources later admitted that the Jenkins bill was a way
of applying pressure on the U.S. Congress to send a message to textile negotiators to secure
a tougher MFA in Geneva. Id.; see Sub Sang Mok, Asia: Economic Reform and a "New
Korea," WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1986 (discussing Reagan's veto of Jenkin's bill); see also John
Yang, House Narrowly Upholds Reagan's Veto of Bill to Curb Textile Shoe Imports, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 17, 1986 (noting President Reagan's veto of bill to roll back imports of textiles
and shoes).
119 See Stuart Anerbach, S. Korea Agrees to Curb On Exports, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1986
(stating MFA will help prevent import surges).
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for equitable and quantifiable compensation to the exporting
participant."120
The GATT Secretariat characterized this iteration of the ar-
rangement by stating that, "[r]estraints under MFA III were not
only more extensive but were in many cases more restrictive."12 '
The TSB observed in its review of the operation that:
while some progress may have been made during the life of
MFA III with respect to the orderly development of world
trade in textiles and to the increase in export earnings of de-
veloping countries, little or no headway has been made in the
objectives of achieving the reduction of barriers and the pro-
gress of liberalization of world trade.*2
Choi, Chung, and Marian noted that this extension of the MFA
strengthened the possibilities for deviations from GATT even
further. 123
During MFA III, the United States applied the system of re-
strictions to more sources and to many more products than previ-
ously. More than one hundred consultation calls were made each
year between 1983 and 1985, and in nearly all cases, new restric-
tions were agreed upon or unilateral measures were taken.' 2 4
Forty-two countries were signatories to MFA 111.125 China, an
important textile trading nation by this point, became a partici-
pant in the MFA,126 despite its inability to join the GATT. China's
120 See Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles,
GATT/1304, Geneva, Dec. 22, 1981, at 5. Essentially the anti-surge clause permitted action
to be taken where an underutilized quota was filled in a short time period. Id. The unex-
pected surge of imports in those product categories created by rapid quota fulfillment re-
sulted in a form of market disruption in the importing country. Id.
121 GATT, Updating the 1984 Secretariat Study "Textiles and Clothing in the World
Economy," Nov. 30, 1987, at 48.
122 Id. at para. 7.12.
123 See YmrG-PEK CHOI ET AL., THE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
55 (1985). This study was carried out under the aegis of the Programme of Cooperation
Among Developing Countries, Exporters of Textiles and Clothing, an inter-governmental
body comprised of 28 countries which fought protectionism against developing country ex-
ports of textiles and clothing. Id. Balian Zutshi, who provided leadership for the group,
later served as India's Trade Ambassador. Id. Nicholas Marian was previously a senior
economist at GATT, working on behalf of the developing exporting countries after his re-
tirement from GATT. Id. This coalition of textile exporting countries later formed the Inter-
national Textiles and Clothing Bureau, located in Geneva, whose primary goal has been to
reduce protectionist restraints on textile/apparel trade. Id.
124 See TEXTnLS AND CLOTHING, supra note 70, at 48 (noting new restrictions in MFA
III).
125 See Anthony Moreton, Uncertain Future for a Bleary-Eyed Pact: The MFA Agreement,
FIN. Turds, Aug. 6, 1986, at 11 (discussing signators to MFA).
126 See id. at 47 (noting China's entry into MFA).
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centrally-controlled economy prevented her from being a member
of GATT at that point, however most parties preferred to have her
in the MFA.1 27 For the importing countries, it provided an oppor-
tunity to formalize and legalize restraints on China's products. 128
For China, bilateral agreements were preferable to unilateral
restraints. 129
D. MFA IV: 1986-1991
During the MFA III years, United States market conditions con-
tinued to worsen. 13 0 In addition to a serious recessionary period in
the early 1980s that altered the way in which the entire softgoods
industry functioned, 13 1 textile and apparel imports grew at an un-
precedented rate. Imports almost doubled in just over two
years. 1 3 2 By the time of the negotiations for the 1986 extension,
business conditions had improved more in the United States than
in the European Community. 1 3 3
In July 1986, fifty-four textile trading nations concluded negoti-
ations for another Protocol of Extension which renewed the MFA
for an additional five years.13 4 The Protocol contained many fea-
tures similar to those of previous extensions.135 The most signifi-
cant change was that additional fibers were covered under the
1986 Protocol.1 36 The growing restrictions on cotton, manufac-
tured fiber, and wool imports, caused a number of developing ex-
porting countries to avoid restrictions on their products by simply
making the products of other fibers, such as flax, ramie, and silk,
127 See, e.g., Peter Grier, U.S. and Growing China Trade, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Aug. 28, 1981, at 14 (discussing China's possible signing of MFA).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., Sol. C. Chaikin, Lets Control Imports Better, FIN. WORLD PARTNERS, Apr. 1,
1986, at 1 (discussing textile market conditions in United States).
131 During the early 1980s recession, both manufacturers and retailers of apparel were
left with excessive inventories representing large losses. As a result, manufacturers and
retailers began to keep smaller inventories, using various just-in-time and quick-response
approaches that permitted faster replenishment of finished goods and components through-
out the softgoods chain.
132 See Robin Anson & Paul Simpson, World Textile Trade and Production Trends, TmE
ECONOWST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 119.
133 But see Chaikin, supra note 130 (noting EEC has used MFA to conserve its textile
industry and workers' jobs, and to reduce textile imports).
134 See Jacobs, supra note 49, at 646-51 (noting MFA has been reviewed three times by
protocols of extension) (1987).
135 See Moreton, supra note 125, at 11 (discussing MFA IV provisions).
136 See id. (discussing additional covered fibers of 1986 MFA agreement).
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along with blends of these fibers.1 3 7 In the United States, imports
from China of non-MFA fiber products increased 346 percent in
1985 over 1984.138 The 1986 Protocol covered products in which
the now-controlled fibers exceeded fifty percent of the weight or
value of the imported goods; pure silk was excluded. The addi-
tional fiber coverage was particularly distressing to India and
China, both of which had developed significant trade in ramie. 139
MFA IV also made special concessions for the least developed
countries. 140 Quotas were typically increased as a percentage
based on the previous year.' 41 For many of the smaller or poorer
developing countries, this provided little room for growth because
the base on which the percentage was calculated was very
small.1 42 Therefore, in this extension, the least developed nations
were given significantly more favorable treatment than the ex-
porting countries that had achieved greater overall economic
development. 14 3
MFA IV did not allow cutbacks or tightening of quotas; that is,
growth could not be "negative." Instead, exporting countries were
required to accept lower rates of growth and flexibility. 144 The im-
porting countries also committed themselves to making improve-
ments in the bilateral agreements for increased access. 145
137 See Chaikin, supra note 130 (discussing cotton restrictions).
138 See generally Herbert Blueweiss, A Statistical Look at Imports; Textile-Apparel Im-
ports, DAmY NEws REC., May 6, 1986, at 16 (noting large increase in imports from China).
139 See Eduardo Lachica, China Accepts Curb of 3%-a-year Rise in Textile Sales, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 21, 1987 (noting China's agreement to restraints on silk, ramie, and other fi-
bers); see also Moreton, supra note 125, at 11 (discussing China's export of ramie).
The proliferation of ramie sweaters in the United States market was an example of how
trade policy affected fashion. Ramie was a previously unfamiliar fiber to United States
consumers until China and India began to use it extensively as a means of avoiding quota
restrictions.
140 See Moreton, supra note 125, at 11 (discussing special concessions drafted on behalf
of least developed countries).141 See generally Despite Failure of Legislation, Retailers Fear Import Restrictions From
Negotiations, 3 (BNA) No.4, 128, 128 (noting that despite veto of legislation restricting tex-
tile and apparel imports, retailers are experiencing difficulty obtaining products from
abroad).
142 See Last Minute Agreement Reached on Extension of MFA to New Imports, 3 BNA
No.32, 995 (Aug. 6, 1986) (noting MFA amendment limited Third World textile imports).
143 Id. (arguing latest MFA benefits Third World exporters at expense of United States
textile industry).
144 See, e.g., Lachica, supra note 139 (discussing bilateral agreement between United
States and China curbing latter's exports).
145 See TExTxLEs AND CLOTHNG, supra note 70, at 50 (discussing how bilateral agree-
ments supplemented terms of MFA IV); see also, Carla Hills, Remarks to the Inst. for Int'l
Econ. Conf. on GAT' (June 25, 1990) (transcript available from Fed. Info. Sys. Corp.) (com-
menting on increased use of bilateral agreements to open U.S. markets to developing
nations).
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E. Extensions of MFA IV: 1991-1993
By the time the MFA was scheduled to expire in July 1991, the
Uruguay Round had been in progress for nearly five years. 4 6 As
part of the Uruguay Round, the developing textile-exporting Con-
tracting Parties demanded that the MFA come to an end, and that
textile trade return to the provisions of the General Agreement. 147
Hence, the successive MFA renewals were for only one year at a
time. 148 As the Uruguay Round talks stalled time and again, par-
ticularly over agriculture trade problems, the one-year MFA ex-
tensions continued for a total of three years. 14 9
Throughout this period, the exporting members pressed to have
more liberal bilateral agreements to allow them to increase textile
shipments to the developed countries. 150 The requests were not
honored, but the Protocols did include clauses to suggest the trad-
ing situations would be improved for the exporting countries.' 5 '
At the insistence of the developed importing countries, particu-
larly the United States, another significant provision, which dealt
with the problems of circumvention, was added to the 1992 Proto-
col. 152 Circumvention refers to activities that bypass quota limits
on shipments, in particular the transhipment of products through
a third country with unused quota. 153 The insistence that this pro-
vision be included indicates the extent to which circumvention
was seen as a problem at the time.
146 See, e.g., William Brock, Remarks on U.S.-European Trade Relations After 1992
(Nov. 2, 1988) (transcript available from Fed. Info. Sys. Corp.) (commenting on Uruguay
Round inception).
147 See Hills, supra note 145 (noting call by developing textile countries to return to pro-
visions of GATT).
148 See, e.g., GATT--Obstacles and Progress, REUTERS, LTD., Dec. 9, 1993 (discussing
one-year extension).
149 See Hills, supra note 145 (discussing frequent stalls in Uruguay Round negotiations).
150 See International Trade, Disputes on Intellectual Property, Textiles Continue Un-
resolved at GATT, 66 (BNA) Der. No. A-20 (Apr. 7, 1989) (discussing possible increase in
imports by United States).
151 Interviews with Marcelo Raffaelli, Chairman of the Textiles Surveillance Body, and
with Tripti Jenkins, Counselor and Assistant to the Textiles Surveillance Body in Geneva,
in 1994.
152 Id.
153 Transhipment is the only form of circumvention recognized by GATT'. In common
usage, however, other forms include inaccurate item counts or mislabeling of fiber content/
product category to take advantage of unused quota. See, e.g., J. Weiller & Allyson L. Senie,
International Rules of the Textile and Apparel Trade Regime, at 505, 513 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 864, 1994). The authors define "transshipment" as
the "rerouting of products through a country other than where produced, to take advantage
of that country's unused quota." Id. In order to curb the flow of transhipment, the United
States has included tough anti-circumvention language in bilateral textile agreements. Id.
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V. CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF THE MFA
From its inception, the MFA was a controversial derogation of
GATT.'1 4 The original arrangement was fairly balanced, and tex-
tile trade was liberalized when compared to the system of unilat-
eral restraints that preceded it. However, each successive Proto-
col extension added features to permit the developed countries to
increase restraints on the imports from the developing exporting
countries. 155
Critics of the MFA have identified many of its shortcomings.
The MFA has been criticized for removing an entire trade sector
from the general rules of GATT. The unique feature of the MFA
was that it involved a multilaterally and formally agreed upon de-
parture from normal GATT rules for the benefit of a particular
industry. This was not an inconsequential amount of trade, par-
ticularly for the developing countries. In 1992 for instance, tex-
tiles and apparel accounted for twenty to thirty percent of many
less developed countries' total merchandise exports. Of total ex-
ports, textiles/apparel exports represented sixty-seven percent,
sixty-nine percent, and fifty-five percent in Bangladesh, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka, respectively. 156
Others have noted that the arrangement violated a basic tenet
of GATT-the non-discrimination rule based on the most-favored-
nation ("MFN") principle. The MFA permits import controls that
discriminate against specific countries on a country-by-country
basis, primarily through negotiation of bilateral agreements. 157
There is also debate as to the increasing discriminatory re-
straints on the developing exporting countries. Originally, a pri-
154 See David M. Trubek, Protectionism and Development: Time For a New Dialogue, 25
N.Y.U. J. IT'iL L. & POL. 345, 355 (1988) (stating MFA negotiations were outside of GATT
and arguably in derogation of GA Ts principles); see also John S. McPhee, Agriculture and
Textiles: The Fare and Fabric of Current GATT Negotiations, 3 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv.
155, 162 (1992) (stating MFA arrangements went against GATT principles).
155 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 53. "Although one of the primary objectives of
the Multifiber Arrangement is to liberalize textile and apparel trade from the Lesser Devel-
oped Countries ("LDCs"), this arrangement has become more protectionist and discrimina-
tory with each subsequent renewal." Id. By the mid-1980s, instead of attempting to phase
out the MFA to return governance of the textile and apparel trade to GATT, MFA IV ex-
panded its coverage to include products manufactured from "silk blends and vegetable fi-
bers, such as ramie, linen, and jute." Id. at 56-57.
156 Author's personal communication with GATT economist, 1994.
157 See Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Environ-
ment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 HIav. ENvrL. L. REv. 185, 190 (1994) (describing non-
discriminatory nature as "pillar" of GATT); see also Wingo, supra note 36 (stating that
GATT was based on non-discriminatory treatment, which was undercut by MFA).
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mary objective of the MFA was to liberalize trade from the lesser
developed nations. However, the Arrangement became increas-
ingly restrictive on imports from these countries, many of whom
depended heavily on the textile/apparel sector for economic
development.
A "gentlemen's agreement" had existed between the European
Community and the United States.158 Although the MFA permit-
ted the imposition of quotas on products from the developing coun-
tries, the United States and European Community textile negotia-
tors agreed in 1977 to refrain from imposing such restraints on
each other's products. The rationale was based on similar labor
and other production costs in the two regions. 159
The MFA has also been criticized for permitting quotas. The
purpose of the textile quota system was to specify quantitative
limits on imported products, despite GATT's specific prohibition of
such limits. 160 Another shortcoming is that importing countries
are not required to compensate the countries whose products are
placed under trade restrictions.
Commentators have further criticized the prolonged "tempo-
rary" protection, which became a way of life. The original ar-
rangement was signed with the understanding that it would pro-
vide a temporary adjustment period for the textile/apparel
industries in the developed importing nations. Counting the STA,
the LTA, and the MFA, this "temporary" protection will have
lasted more than forty years by the time the last quotas are
eliminated. 161
Still other analysts point out the introduction of the "market
disruption" concept. 162 Other sectors could have adopted this con-
cept to protect domestic markets, however only the textile/apparel
sector has used it.
158 Based on author's conversations with numerous trade delegates in Geneva during
various visits from 1984 to 1994.
159 Id.
160 See John S. McPhee, Agriculture and Textiles: The Fare and Fabric of Current GAYT
Negotiations, 3 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 155, 161-62 (1992) (discussing purpose of textile
quota system).
161 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 51-170 (1987) (providing an excellent, but non-
objective discussion of temporary quota protection). Lack of objectivity may be attributed to
the fact that authors are affiliated with a Washington, DC, law firm known for its work
with U.S. importers and the governments of textile-exporting nations.
162 See CLUNE, supra note 91, at 147 (discussing market disruption concept).
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Furthermore, the MFA had its own institutionalized structures,
at both the GATT level 163 and within each participating nation, to
implement the complex system associated with the textile-specific
trade rules. Other trade sectors, except for perhaps agriculture,
have had no similar structures to handle trade matters either in
Geneva or in Washington.
Finally, textile trade restraints have been criticized for creating
ill will among trading partners. The strong positions taken on
textile trade by the United States and the European Community
have taken a toll on international relationships beyond textile
trade matters. Some cases have involved retaliation, while others
have caused representatives of the lesser developed countries to
question the integrity of their more powerful trading partners. A
notable example was President Nixon's strategy to force Japan to
agree to added fiber restraints.
VI. THE URUGUAY ROUND: GRADuAL DEMISE OF THE MFA
Textile trade was an issue from the earliest discussions regard-
ing the GATT round of trade talks, later known as the Uruguay
Round. 164 The less developed countries made it clear they would
not participate in the talks unless the United States and other
countries honored commitments under the MFA.165 From the out-
set, developing exporting countries pressed to have textile trade
return to the original GATT rules. The ministers at the Uruguay
talks made indefinite reference to "eventual integration of this
sector into GATT."166
As the Uruguay Round talks ensued, most trading nations had
agreed by 1989 to bring textile trade back under mainstream
GATT regulations. Successive deadlines passed, however, with no
completion of the Round in sight, due mostly to agricultural trade
163 The textile staff usually functioned quite independently of others at GATT, based on
information from a non-textile staffer in the GATT Secretariat.
164 See Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World Economy, 29 INT'L
LAw. 15, 18 (1995) (stating Uruguay Round addressed new issues such as textiles, intellec-
tual property, and agriculture).
165 See J. Calcott, GATT Meeting Split on Textile Protectionism, DAmY NEWS REC., Nov.
27, 1984, at 3, 8 (noting desire by less developed countries to ensure that United States
honored its commitments under MFA).
166 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Sept. 20, 1986, Sept. 20, 1986
GATT, B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19, 25 (1985-86).
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issues. 167 United States and European Community textile indus-
try leaders were relieved by each stalemate, hoping an agreement
would never materialize.
The GATT Negotiating Group on Textiles and Clothing made
progress but reached an impasse on issues related to phasing out
the MFA. These issues included the degree of quota growth to al-
low during a phase-out period. Arthur Dunkel, Director General
of GATT at that time, released his proposal that came to be known
as the "Dunkel Draft," or "Dunkel Plan," which set forth a pro-
posed "Agreement on Textiles and Clothing." Dunkel recom-
mended a staged phasing out of MFA import quotas, with certain
percentages of textile trade to be removed in stages from the quota
system over a 10-year period, as well as increases in growth rates
on quotas.168
The Dunkel Plan encountered hostile response from nearly all
affected industry sectors, including textiles, labor, and retailers/
importers, in both the United States and the European Commu-
nity.169 The congressional textile leaders threatened to modify the
Uruguay Round agreement if an MFA phase-out was proposed.
This threat was stifled by President Bush's success in acquiring
fast track authority, permitting approval or disapproval, but not
modification, of the GATT agreement when it reached Congress.
Despite the external protests to the Dunkel Plan for textiles, the
final agreement closely resembled what Dunkel had proposed over
two years before the Uruguay Round was completed. Individuals
involved in the textile negotiations reported that although some
participants were dissatisfied with various aspects of the proposal,
they were willing to accept the overall plan. Participants reported
a general feeling that if they had begun to "tinker" with the propo-
sal, it would have unraveled entirely. 170
On December 15, 1993, the landmark GATT accord met with
agreement after seven long years of negotiations-a prolonged
167 See Al J. Daniel, Jr., Agricultural Reform: The European Community, the Uruguay
Round, and International Dispute Resolution, 46 ARv. L. REV. 873, 874-75 (1994) (discuss-
ing ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations which missed deadlines largely because of
changes in agricultural policy).
168 See GATT, Textiles and Clothing, GATr Activities 1991, Geneva, 1992; see also L.
HuRmwrrz, THm GAIT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HisTORY (1986-1992): TEXTiLEs
(1993) (providing detailed account of textile negotiations, including Dunkel Plan).
169 Jim Ostroff, Textile, Apparel Makers Blast GATT Plan on MFA, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAULy, Jan. 8, 1992, at 20 (noting industry dissatisfaction with Dunkel Plan).
170 Author's discussions with trade officials, Geneva, 1994.
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time that led some critics to refer to the GATT as the "General
Agreement to Talk and Talk." The Uruguay Round agreement
called for a ten year phase-out17' of the MFA quotas, to occur in
three stages (based on each country's 1990 import volume), with
each importing country permitted to identify the categories on
which the quotas are "surrendered" at each stage.
When the Uruguay Round agreement went into effect on Janu-
ary 1, 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced GATT.
At the same time, the Uruguay Round Agreement on textiles and
Clothing (ATC) superseded the MFA and all textile and apparel
trade matters among WTO members came under this new multi-
lateral agreement.
. Under stage one of the ATC, which began in 1995, quotas cho-
sen for surrender must have accounted for at least sixteen percent
of the country's total textile and apparel imports in 1990. Re-
maining quotas would be allowed to grow at higher rates than the
typical six percent quota growth rates that generally existed
under the MFA. This added quota growth is known as the
"growth on growth" provision. During this stage, remaining quo-
tas must grow in each of the three years at rates no less than six-
teen percent higher than the twelve months preceding the effec-
tive date of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 172
Stage two, beginning in 1998, requires the importing country to
choose for integration product categories whose imports account
for at least seventeen percent of the country's 1990 import volume.
Furthermore, remaining quotas will be permitted to grow in each
of the four years at rates which are at least twenty-five percent
higher than under stage one.' 73
Under stage three, which begins in 2002, the importing country
again chooses the categories to surrender to integration. These
categories must account for at least eighteen percent of the coun-
try's 1990 import volume. Remaining quotas will be allowed to
171 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, General Agreement on Textiles & Clothing, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1125-272 (1994). United States textile leaders demanded
a 15-year phase-out and had expected it because President Clinton had promised he would
seek the longer phase-out in exchange for the industry's support on the North American
Free Trade Agreement. Id.
172 See id. at 1179; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2 (discussing limits on quota growth).
173 See id. (discussing remaining quotas).
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grow in each of the three years at rates which are at least twenty-
seven percent higher than under stage two.
Thus, by 2005, special protection for textiles and apparel will no
longer exist. Textile and apparel trade will be integrated fully
into trade rules for all other sectors. 174
In addition to quota phase-outs, tariffs will be reduced on an
annual basis. After 2005, only tariffs will remain. The textile and
apparel agreement included a safeguard mechanism to be used
during the phase-out period if an importing country determines
that imports are causing injury or threat of injury.1 75 Based on
past experience, representatives of the less developed exporting
countries fear this mechanism may be abused.1 76 Within the im-
porting countries, fascinating political drama has accompanied
the selection of categories to be integrated and determination of
who is entitled to make those choices. In the United States, for
example, many textile products that were never under the quota
restraints were "surrendered" in the first round. By employing
strategies such as these, domestic industries are postponing the
"day of reckoning" in a manner that will create a more dramatic
influx of imports in later stages.
VII. REFLECTIONS ON TEXTILE TRADE POLICIES UNDER GATT
Except for the first few years of GATT's existence, textile trade
has presented special difficulties. Textile problems challenged the
integrity of the General Agreement for most of its existence. Tex-
tiles, for a host of reasons, became a "special case" in world trade
that sometimes jeopardized broader international relationships.
The sector was considered adequately "special" to have its own set
of trade policies which co-existed with the policies for all other sec-
tors, and to have its own institutionalized bodies to enforce the
special agreements.
174 See, e.g., Sri Ram Khanna, The New GATT Agreement: Implications for the World's
Textile and Clothing Industries, TEXrrn OuTLOOK INT'L, Mar. 1994, at 10-37 (discussing
phase out of textile quotas).
175 See Ernesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma: The Jekyll & Hyde of
Trade Protection, 15 J. INT'L L. Bus. 105, 131-32 (1994) (stating need to "clarify and rein-
force" safeguard mechanism in GATT framework in order to bring all emergencies and
nuances under GATT umbrella); see also Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contemporary Prac-
tice of the United States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INV'L L. 312, 321 (1994)
(discussing slow transition for textile industry into GATT and necessary safeguard
mechanisms).
176 Conversations with trade officials, Geneva, 1994.
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A number of observations may be useful in analyzing textile
trade policies. A common thread among these observations has
been the political aspect of trade for the textile/apparel sector, in
which policymakers have often succumbed to special interest
group pressure.
Goldstein177 observed that political ideology has dictated United
States commercial policy in a way that may not be in the best
long-term interests of the nation. She argued that our system's
limited power for economic intervention and the demands of pleas-
ing voters make it "impossible for central decision-makers to use
rational decision-making criteria to create policy." In the absence
of a national umbrella policy for trade, Goldstein concluded that
"certain industries for anomalous and different reasons have been
excepted from liberal policy, and certain industries who are in de-
cline but who employ large numbers of workers may get more aid
than would be expected."
Similarly, Hufbauer and Rosen 178 noted that special protection
is inequitable among industries. Large industries with political
clout, such as textiles and apparel, "are able to shake the United
States political system for massive benefits. " 179 In contrast,
smaller industries or those with only regional influence, such as
footwear, get far less protection.
Aggarwal offered the view that the United States fragmentation
of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
has provided the state with limited opportunities to influence poli-
cymaking. °80 He suggested that the state is no match for the
strong and previously cohesive' political organization of the tex-
tile and apparel industry. According to Aggarwal, the United
States has been too organizationally fragmented to establish a na-
tional policy or to resist industry and labor demands.
177 J. Goldstein, A Re-Examination of American Trade Policy: An Inquiry into the
Causes of Protectionism 427 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U.C.L.A.).
178 See G. HUFBAUER & H. ROSEN, TRADE POLICY FOR TROUBLED INDUSThms 27 (1986)
(discussing great power of textile industry).
179 Id.
180 See AGGARwAL, supra note 15, at ch. 2 (discussing effect of separation of powers on
United States policymaking).
181 Until 1989, the United States textile and apparel industry groups worked together in
a closely knit anti-import coalition. Because of the growing use of offshore sourcing by
large United States apparel firms, however, the American Apparel Manufacturers Associa-
tion backed away from this coalition.
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CONCLUSION
It may safely be concluded that world textile and apparel trade
has been regulated extensively through means other than simple
market forces. In short, textile and apparel trade has posed a
long-term and persistent challenge to policymakers. GATT au-
thors concluded:
More so than in most other industries, trade in textiles and
clothing-and thus the pattern of production and employment
in those industries around the globe-has been influenced by
government intervention. This holds whether we view it in
terms of the length of time that restrictions have been widely
used..., or in terms of the level of restrictions in force at any
point in time, or in terms of the number of different policies
simultaneously influencing the level of imports [emphasis
added].
Giesse and Lewin echoed a similar sentiment, asserting that
"[tihis specialized regulatory scheme-together with its separate
bureaucracy, a multitude of bilateral textile agreements, and nu-
merous unilaterally imposed quotas-has protected the United
States textile and apparel sector more extensively and for a longer
period than the protection afforded to any other United States
manufacturing industry."' 82
The phase-out of the MFA quota system under the WTO closes a
chapter of one of the most unique trade policies of the Twentieth
Century. Global trade for the textile sector will surely change rad-
ically as the three stages of quota integration occur, however, tex-
tiles will continue to be a sensitive and complex area of global
trade. Too many nations have too much at stake.
182 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 55, at 53-54 (stressing extensive protection received
by U.S. textile industry exceeded that of any other American industry).
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